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The manifestos of many of the political parties that contested South Africa's recent general election illustrate the fact that corruption is regarded as a major problem in the country. For instance, the African National Congress (ANC) 2014 election manifesto commits the ANC to 'intensify the fight against corruption', stating that the ANC 'is committed to a corruption-free society, ethical behaviour across society and a government that is accountable to the people'.
1 For many people in South Africa declarations such as these, by the ANC and its representatives, are highly incongruous.
Though he is not the only ANC member to have been implicated, this is above all because Jacob Zuma, ANC president and President of South Africa, has repeatedly been linked to allegations of corruption.
As this article will discuss, the fact that Zuma, Nevertheless, other than in the Western Cape, the ANC remained the dominant party in all provinces and in all metropolitan areas other than Cape Town.
Though some argued that this might be understood to reflect support for the ANC broadly, rather than for Zuma specifically, 2 it remains clear that Zuma himself continues to enjoy considerable personal support. 
This article provides a 'high level' view of current debates about the causes of and remedies for corruption in South Africa, with a view to reflecting on how to address corruption. The article starts by providing an overview of the current integrity framework and initiatives to strengthen it within the domains of public administration and criminal justice. Alongside this, the article briefly reviews historical and sociological accounts of corruption in South Africa. This provides the basis for a discussion of the moral economy of corruption. Instead of focusing on questions of surveillance or deterrence, this strand of analysis implies that addressing corruption is not simply about addressing 'moral deficits' but engaging with questions about how to advance justice and fairness in South African society.
support raises questions about attitudes to corruption in South Africa. It is of course likely that some of those who support the ANC are themselves firmly opposed to corruption. They might support the ANC on the basis of its role in South Africa's liberation from apartheid, or on the basis of its programmes and social policies. Nevertheless, the ANC's and Zuma's continued popularity points to an obvious conclusion:
that rather than being 'united against corruption ', 4 many South Africans are willing to excuse or overlook acts of corruption. 13 have also introduced codes of conduct.
There are also provisions for financial disclosure, and a prohibition against members of the public service doing remunerative work outside of the public service without express authorisation from the executive authority. 14 Provisions also exist to ensure accountability for the management of finances in government departments 15 as well as a legislative and regulatory framework governing public procurement (supply chain management) 16 and protecting whistleblowers. 17 The Prevention and Combating NPA. 34 The AFU may be assumed to be part of the task team by virtue of being located within the NPA.
In addition, several 'hotlines' have been established by government to facilitate reporting of alleged corruption or other problems.
Governance and oversight
As distinct from the 'law enforcement' role that is performed by many of the agencies referred to above, there are also a number of government agencies that provide oversight, which includes monitoring state agencies and promoting their compliance with the regulatory and ethics framework.
These include:
• The DPSA
• The PSC
• The Auditor-General (AG)
• In addition to ensuring compliance with financial and Public Protector's Office'.
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• All public servants will be prohibited from doing business with the state. 43 The extension of provisions in this regard was motivated by the realisation that those doing business with the state were not necessarily only those at the most senior levels.
• Obligations regarding financial disclosure will be extended to all government employees at national, provincial and municipal level. • Recent events have also highlighted shortcomings in the Executive Members Ethics
Act. 56 The Act does not take account of the possibility that the Public Protector may make a finding against the President. The President is supposed to inform Parliament about action to be taken against members of the executive who are implicated in a report by the Public Protector.
In effect the President decides on action to be taken against him or herself. 
Political interference
The NDP therefore defends the multi-agency system.
However, it strongly emphasises the need to insulate agencies that are part of the system 'from political pressures'. 67 Of the agencies in the system, the office of the Public Protector, under Thuli Madonsela, is perhaps the only one that is currently regarded as operating relatively autonomously and willing to resist such pressure. 68 But the Public Protector has limited power to enforce remedial action. For example, ANC leaders and others used the findings of an inter-ministerial task team to nullify findings against Zuma in Madonsela's report on the construction of his homestead at Nkandla. 69 In addition, not all of the previous incumbents of the office have acted with the same degree of fearlessness, 70 indicating that the nature of the role played by the Public Protector's office is strongly affected by the character of its leadership.
The SIU is the only agency solely dedicated to investigating corruption. But it can only initiate investigations on the basis of presidential proclamations, is orientated towards 'civil' rather than criminal resolution of cases, and its head is appointed by the President. 71 has also been linked to efforts to secure Zuma's ascension to the Presidency. 75 It has therefore been argued in the media that Zuma's supporters are willing to execute 'a scorched earth strategy on public institutions' to preserve Zuma's power. 76 If this is the case, the implication is that there are significant constraints on the possibility that the autonomy of the criminal justice system will be reinforced. This is notwithstanding the fact that this is motivated for in the NDP 77 which, in addition to a general call for the autonomy of agencies in the multi-agency system to be reinforced, also motivates for the senior leadership of the SAPS to be appointed by means of a competitive process presided over by a panel. 78 In the light of the risks involved there is unlikely to be much enthusiasm for these recommendations among South Africa's current political leadership.
In order to resolve this impasse some observers have proposed that there should be a blanket amnesty for acts of corruption. 79 This, it is argued, would mean that members of the political elite no longer have the incentive to undermine the criminal justice system. In return for the amnesty it is proposed that one would be able to secure the 'removal of the entire Criminal solidarity … and will be hostile towards any regulatory measures, whatever their merits, which emanate from outside the group'. 108 In due course they run the risk of creating 'a parallel system of power that turns our democracy into an empty shell'.
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Implications for addressing integrity The absence of a broad anti-corruption consensus needs to be taken into account in understanding how to deepen anti-corruption initiatives. In many countries public pressure has been crucial in creating a political environment where investigations against high-level officials are possible. 112 There has as yet not been any instance where it has been possible to mobilise broad popular opinion against corruption, with corruption providing the main motivation for only a relatively small number of community protests. 113 Instead, over recent years, the biggest popular mobilisation in relation to matters of corruption was in support of the efforts to protect Zuma against having to face trial for corruption. In many other instances where alleged corruption is exposed, it appears to be motivated by the desire to settle political scores rather than by an intolerance of corruption.
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Though there is an elaborate integrity framework already in place, and steps are being taken to strengthen it, the impression is that anti-corruption 
